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Abstract 
The application of continuous distributions from statistics in spatial modelling makes it 
possible to represent discrete choices in a spatial continuum, and to obtain efficiency 
results and competitive equilibrium prices where aggregate or discretized models fail. 
Along these lines, and combining principles established by Aumann and Hildenbrand in 
the sixties with recent results from stochastic optimization, the paper develops a 
practical modeling framework for land use planning and presents the associated 
stochastic algorithms for numerical implementation. We consider groups of consumers 
and producers whose activities are distributed over space, and who have to make 
decisions, say, about where to live, which marketplace to visit, and which infrastructure 
facilities to invest in. After presenting a general equilibrium model in which all 
consumers meet their own budget with given transfers, we focus on the case in which 
transfers among consumer groups adjust to support the maximization of a given social 
welfare criterion. It appears that this optimization problem becomes more tractable if it is 
treated as the minimization of a dual welfare function, that solely depends on prices but is 
evaluated after integration over space. Next, we apply the dual welfare function to 
represent (non-rival) demand that simultaneously benefits several agents, reflecting a 
general informational infrastructure as well as investments with uncertain outcomes. This 
leads to a minimax problem, in which the dual welfare function is to be minimized with 
respect to prices and maximized with respect to non-rival demand. Finally, we endogenize 
welfare weights jointly with prices to model, for example, a land consolidation process 
whereby none of the participants should lose relative to the initial situation, and the gains 
could be shared according to agreed principles. This gives rise to a bargaining problem 
whose solution can be found by jointly minimizing the dual welfare function over prices 
and welfare weights, subject to constraints. 
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 General equilibrium and welfare modeling in spatial continuum: 
A practical framework for land use planning 
 
Michiel Keyzer, Yuri Ermoliev and Vladimir Norkin 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the interface of geography and economics, the practical relevance of applied policy models 
has often been limited by their lack of empirical detail in representing the distribution of spatial 
and social characteristics of the economy under study. Elaborate household surveys have been 
conducted and detailed geographic information systems were set up, but the databases are 
rarely used in regional or national models, due to the relatively high level of social and spatial 
aggregation that is required to keep the analysis tractable at that level. The situation is even less 
satisfactory when it comes to dealing with spatial distributions of uncertain events, which are 
either neglected altogether or dealt with through a small number of alternative states of nature. 
Continuous joint densities would seem to be the natural setting for representation of spatial 
characteristics. They often significantly simplify the analysis, and also have the advantage that 
they permit to address current issues in land use planning, that naturally involve discrete 
choices and other non-convexities, and are very difficult to handle within general equilibrium 
theory and welfare modeling if space is represented by a classification in separate categories. 
 First, the selection of an optimal location for a facility is a classical problem that 
often involves discrete choice. This problem usually amounts to finding the geographical 
location of an industrial facility that minimizes the cost of transporting goods to that location 
from a surrounding region or vice versa. The early location models are classical 
transportation models and only select the best out of a finite number of alternatives and treat 
the region as a finite number of fields identified by their barycentre. Subsequent 
location/pricing models treat the site as a continuous choice variable and simultaneously 
calculate the consumer price at every point in the region on the basis of the distance from the 
facility (see Hansen et al., 1987, and Drezner, 1995, for surveys). Second, land use itself has 
become an important field of application especially in relation to environmental issues. Here 
the vocation of the land (nature-agriculture-industry, or by crop) is the discrete choice 
variable to be determined so as to maximize, say, the social welfare in the region, possibly 
subject to zoning constraints. And for urban uses, indivisibilities of infrastructure and 
agglomeration effects must be accounted for. Third, the analysis of transportation and 
migration is also faced with discrete choices as to the destination and the mode of 
transportation. (see e.g. Fujita et al., 1999). 
 This paper proposes a framework and a solution algorithm for a spatial general 
equilibrium model that can incorporate the full distribution of such characteristics, and can 
accommodate discrete choice. It assumes that individuals in society are located on a joint 
density over physical space, social characteristics and random events. Thus, we interpret 
“spatial” in a broad sense, and the geographical coordinates may only be two among the many 
coordinates of the space. Representation in a continuum is often used in mathematical 
modeling, to bypass non-essential effects associated with the discontinuous nature of real world 
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processes. For example, in control theory (see e.g. Alekseev, Tihomirov, Fomin, 1979), the 
assumption of continuous time convexifies the attainable sets, and leads to Pontryagin’s 
maximum principle. Kantorovich (1942) studied classical transportation problems in a spatial 
continuum. In economics Aumann (1964, 1966) and Hildenbrand (1970, 1973) were first to 
study a continuum of agents within general equilibrium theory. Aumann (1966) and 
Hildenbrand (1970) assume continuity of consumer preferences and hence continuity of the 
corresponding utility functions but relax the usual concavity requirements on utilities. 
Consequently, consumer demands may be discontinuous. Hildenbrand (1970) includes a finite 
number of profit maximizing producers with a convex aggregate production set. Treating 
consumers as atomless and distributed according to a smooth density enables both authors to 
prove existence of competitive equilibria, − i.e. the existence of endogenously generated prices 
at which aggregate demand does not exceed supply, while consumers and producers take prices 
as given and maximize utility and profits, respectively, according to optimization problems that 
may exhibit nonconvexities − essentially because all individuals are assumed to be sufficiently 
different to ensure that agents whose demand or supply exhibits a discontinuity at the 
prevailing prices have measure zero and can be disregarded.  
 However, this assumption is  non-constructive, in the sense that it is introduced after 
derivation of individual behavior from preferences and technology. This makes it difficult 
actually to build a model that meets the requirement, and may be one reason for the class of 
models not to have found numerical application so far, another being that the common 
computational approaches require discretization of infinite dimensional models that could 
destroy continuity of the aggregate excess demand. 
 In this paper, building on the non-convex spatial problems for producers considered in 
Keyzer and Ermoliev (1999), we develop a formulation that also considers consumers and 
endogenizes the market prices, with the aim to model spatial decisions and to construct 
geographic maps of consumption, production, income and poverty, under alternative policy 
regimes. Despite the non-convexities considered, we establish sufficient conditions for the 
continuity of the aggregate excess demand function, and hence for the existence and efficiency 
of the resulting market equilibrium.  
 Regarding the specification as a general equilibrium model, we restrict the class 
considered in several respects. First, we deal with discrete choice, as a particular source of non-
convexity. But since virtually every non-convexity can be represented in the way, this hardly 
imposes a limitation. Second, we allow for full satiation of consumers. When consumers are 
atomless, their demand could remain infinite at equilibrium, provided it has zero measure. This 
seems unrealistic and creates unnecessary complications. It is avoided by allowing for satiation. 
Third, the critical step in ensuring that non-convexities may be bypassed is to guarantee that all 
agents making the same discrete choice are sufficiently different. For this, it suffices to require 
nonstationarity with respect to a single characteristic. Fourth, our convexity requirements are 
strict, ensuring that individual net demands are almost everywhere single- rather than 
multivalued. Finally, after introducing a model that treats transfers between consumer groups 
(regions) as given, we soon focus on the special case where transfers adjust to maximize a 
given social welfare objective. It appears that the problem becomes more tractable if it is 
treated as the minimization of a dual welfare function, that solely depends on prices, rather than 
as a maximization in terms of quantities, since these are unknown functions of characteristics. 
 We also introduce two extensions. First, we allow for (nonrival) demand that 
simultaneously benefits several agents, in order to represent general informational 
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infrastructure as well as investments with uncertain outcomes. This leads to a minimax 
problem, with a dual welfare function to be minimized with respect to prices and maximized 
with respect to nonrival demand. Second, we endogenize welfare weights jointly with prices to 
obtain a model that could represent, for example, a land consolidation process whereby none of 
the participants should lose relative to the initial situation, and the gains could be shared 
according to agreed principles. This gives rise to a bargaining problem whose solution is found 
by joint minimization of the dual welfare function over prices and welfare weights, subject to 
constraints. 
 Regarding computation, the main step is that we treat the distributions of characteristics 
as probability distributions. For solving the general equilibrium model with exogenous 
transfers, this enables us to rely on the stochastic procedures given in Ermoliev et al. (2000). 
However, we focus on the special case in which aggregate excess demand satisfies the Weak 
Axiom of Revealed Preference, specifically on the situation in which transfers adjust to 
maximize a given social welfare criterion. We show that, after integration of individual excess 
demands over space, the aggregate excess demand for such models is the negative of the 
gradient of the dual welfare function and hence satisfies the Weak Axiom. This enables us to 
develop variants of stochastic tâtonnement for such models, which  are in effect stochastic 
equivalents of the classical Walrasian tâtonnement. But whereas the classical tâtonnement at 
each step adjusts the market price for every commodity on the basis of its aggregate excess 
demand, the stochastic variant only activates a random sample of agents from an infinite set. 
The tâtonnement indicates a direction of price change, purely on the basis of the net demand 
within this sample. Though the case satisfying the Weak Axiom is admittedly restrictive, it 
permits to apply a faster algorithm that has well understood convergence properties and that 
can naturally be extended into a minimax procedure which adjusts quantities and welfare 
weights in parallel with prices, to represent nonrivalry and bargaining. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the distribution of spatial and 
social characteristics. Producer and consumer behavior under discrete choice are described in 
sections 3 and 4, respectively. Existence of a competitive equilibrium and of a solution to the 
spatial welfare model is established in section 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 discusses the 
stochastic tâtonnement procedure and its application to both. Next, section 8 incorporates non-
rival demand and formulates the associated minimax procedure. Finally, section 9 shows how 
bargain can be included and leads to joint minimization over weights and prices. 
 
2. The continuum of agents: distribution of characteristics 
 
We seek to develop an operational modeling framework that can combine geographical 
information with household survey data while avoiding aggregation to a discrete number of 
income groups and subregions. Each answer in the survey questionnaire defines one 
characteristic, while the frequency of answers specifies the distribution of these characteristics 
in the sample. If a characteristic relates to an exogenous variable of the analysis (e.g. previous 
occupation of the respondent, or geographical location), it can be treated as part of a vector 
. Assuming that the survey was well designed, and representative, it is possible to 
infer from this sample the distribution at the level of the population.  
mRXx ⊂∈
)x(G
 In our computational procedure we view G  as a probability measure on an 
appropriate probability space for which we use the following formal  general concepts. 
)x(
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Let denote the  Banach space of integrable in power q  functions on for some 
The multifunction  is called (Borel)-measurable if it has a 
Borel graph in , (see Aumann, 1965, Hildenbrand, 1974, and Castaing and Valadier, 
1977, for the concept of measurable multifunctions). 
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Assumption 2.1 Let be an m-dimensional real vector of characteristics and ,x  where 
is a compact in . The distribution  defines a  measure on ,X   and this measure 
 on is a product of the absolutely continuous (with respect to 
Lebesgue measure) measure G  on and the σ-additive and complete measure G  on 
Y.  
YX ⊗1
1 y
 
We note that continuity is only required for a single characteristic, say, element . This is 
important because survey data often comprise a large number of discrete characteristics, such 
as farm/non-farm or male/female. It is always possible to introduce an artificial, continuous 
variable, say, , that creates a "pseudo"-continuum and only serves to eliminate 
discontinuities that might arise from non-convexities. In this paper, all characteristics are taken 
to  describe the spatial or social diversity of agents. This makes it safe to treat X as a compact 
set, and also ensures that for a continuous, Borel measurable function  u  and distribution 
G(x), the integrability over X is assured and the function 
),( xc∫= X )x(,c((
),( xc
u)cU  is 
continuous. By Lebesgue’s dominance convergence theorem U  is continuous if  u  is 
continuous in c  and majorated by some integrable function, for example, if 
(
u)u ≤ for 
some given . However, some components of could also be taken to represent uncertain 
events for which the compactness of  X is no longer guaranteed.   
 Before formulating the producer model with setup costs and discrete decisions in 
general terms, we present a simple example that introduces the approach to eliminate 
discontinuities. This is essentially based on the following lemmas   that ensure the non-
stationarity w.r.t.  of the value function  of the decision problems, i.e. when  
 for  .      ) 2x≠
 
Lemma 1.  Assume that (i) the problem }0)x,|)x,z(f{ ≤ has a solution for 
any ; (ii) the function  is strictly increasing in x; and (iii)  is 
nonincreasing in x. Then, the function F(x) is strictly increasing in x. 
)x,z
 
Proof. Choose ,  and h . Since  
  while  it follows that ฀ )( 1xF )), 21 xx 0),(( 1 ≤xxz ).()( 1 FxF < <)), 11 xf(
 
Lemma 2.  Assume that (i) the problem }0)x,h|)x,z(f{ ≤  has a solution for 
any ; (ii) the function  is non-decreasing in x; (iii)  is strictly decreasing 
in x; and (iv) for any (z, x) there exists an arbitrary small 
(zf )x,z(
z∆ such that )x,z(f,z+z(f ∆  
(for example, )x,z( ≠ , ε >0). Then, the function F(x) is strictly increasing in x. 
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Proof. Choose and and  Now  is an 
internal point of the set {  since by (ii)  
Furthermore, by (iii) and assumption (iv), there exists a value 
21 xx < ),x),x(z(f)x(F 111 =
},0)x,z(h|z 2 ≤ .0)x),x(z(h
11 ≤
),(( 21 xxzh
)x(z 1
),( 11 xxz .0)() ≤< h
z∆  such that 
and  ฀ 0)2 ≤x,z)x(z(h 1 + ∆).( 1xF= )(f) 1> x),x(z 1x,z)x(z(f 11 + ∆)2 ≥x,z)x(z(f)x(F 12 +≥ ∆
 
Finally, the next lemma gives a sufficient condition for the level set of a partially 
nonstationary function to have zero measure. This is the main regularity property that makes 
it possible to neglect the discontinuities in response functions after integration. 
 
Lemma 3. Assume that (i) function  is measurable in ( on a 
product of measurable sets  (ii)  is nonstationary in variable 
1:),( RYXyxf →⊗
;mR⊆ )y,x(f )y,x,1 YRX ⊆ x , i.e. 
  for any  and ),(),( 21 yxfyxf ≠ X∈2 Yxx ≠1 y∈ ;  (iii) measure G on 
 is a product of a σ-additive  and  complete measure G y= x GG ⊗YX ⊗
0)y,x(f|)y,x{(G =
y on Y and (iv)  absolutely 
continuous (with respect to Lebesgue measure) measure G  on X. Then 
 
x
.0} =
 
Proof. For any Yy∈ by (ii) the set { }0),(| =yxfx consists of no more than one point. By 
(iv),G  And by the Fubini theorem (e.g. Kolmogorov and Fomin, 1981): }.(|{ xfxx 0), =y
  ∫ ==== Y x 0)y(dG}0)y,x(f|x{G}0)y,x(f|)y,x{(G .฀  
 
In subsequent sections we often use the following important fact. Let    
 ∫= ∈X Dd )x(dG)x,d,p(vmax)p(V , 
 
where 
nRD∈  is a compact set, v  is convex and continuous in ),,( xdp p , continuous in d  
and integrable in x , its subdifferential  ),,( xdpvp∂  is bounded for all  by an 
integrable in 
Dd ∈
x  function. Then, by well known results on  subdifferentiation of integral 
functions and the differentiation of a maximum function  (see e.g. Clarke, 1983, Levin, 
1985), and for co  denoting the convex hull, the following result holds. }{⋅
 
Lemma 4. The subdifferential ∂  of V  is expressed as follows: )( pV )( p ∫ ∈∂∫ =∂=∂ ∈ X pX Ddp )x(dG)}x,p(dd|)x,d,p(v{co)x(dG)x,d,p(vmax)p(V , 
where . In addition, if v  is continuously 
differentiable in 
)x,d,p(vmaxarg)x,p(d Dd∈= ),,( xdp
p  with gradient νp(p,d,x), then d  is single valued for any ),( xp p and 
 is continuously differentiable with gradient )( pV ∫= =X )x,p(ddpp )x(dG)x,d,p(v)p(V . 
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Proof. See Clarke (1983), Levin (1985). ฀ 
 
Example 1: Single output and input commodity 
 
Suppose that “producers” are distinguished by a characteristic x , say, geographic location and 
distributed over an area according to the smooth distribution function G . The firm at spot )x(
x produces a single output commodity, using a single input commodity, according to a strictly 
concave production function , with setup costs , where denotes input use. The 
firm maximizes the discontinuous profit function: 
)x,v(f )(0 xg v
 
 [ vp)x,v(g)x,v(fpmax)x,p( 210v ]−−= ≥π , (2.1) 
 
where  if and 0)x,v(g = 0v = )(),( 0 xgxvg =  if , while  and  are the given prices 
of the output and input, respectively, and 
0v >
p,p
21
1p 2p
)(p = . This defines a discontinuous input 
demand such that )x,p(v 0)x,p(v =  if 0)x,p( =π , and  if 0)(v >x,p .0)x,p( >π  Since 
, this discontinuous problem can also be rewritten as the mixed-integer program:  0) =x,0(f
 
 [ vp)x,v(g)x,v(fp max)x,p( 211,0,0v ]−−= =≥ δπ δ . (2.2) 
 
Furthermore, 
 
 [ ]∫ ∫== ),x(dG )0),x,p(max()x(dG )x,p()p( ππΠ  (2.3) 
 
for ( vp)x(g)x,v(fpmax)x,p( 2010v )−−= ≥π , assuming that this function is integrable. 
Now if  ),( xpπ   is non-stationary with respect to , then  1x 0}0)x,p(:x{ ==G π , implying 
that the points at which a switch takes place can be neglected in the integration. Consequently, 
the following properties hold. First, aggregate profit )p(Π  is continuously differentiable 
and convex in p. Second, the aggregate output and input coincide with the one obtained after 
integration of input demand in the original problem (2.1), and, by Hotelling's lemma (Varian, 
1992), are equal to the negative of the derivative of the profit function (see also Lemma 4).  
To our knowledge, this  approach has not found practical application so far, presumably 
because of the difficulties in dealing with maximization problems generally involving, multi-
dimensional integrals, as in (2.3). Stochastic quasigradient procedures − to be discussed in 
section 7 − enable us to deal with the maximization of multidimensional integrals without 
having to approximate or  evaluate them explicitly. 
 
3. Producer behavior 
 
 We consider a set of marketplaces indexedλ , located at λx , with L,...,1=λ . 
Commodities are traded at these marketplaces and fetch a price λp
p
. Let  denote the 
vector of stacked prices of all marketplaces partitioned into (
nRp +∈
)p L,...,,...,p1 λ .    
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 Next, we introduce  the production model with discrete characteristics, representing  H  
technology types indexed h, J  firm types, indexed j, K commodities, indexed k. At x, every 
firm of type j maximizes profits, at given prices p solving: 
  
 
( )
       ,}1,0{ ,1                        
0,x),(yH    .       s.t          
      pymax )x,p(
h
h
j
h
j
h
h
j
h
j
h
j
h
h
j
h
j,yj h
j
h
j
∑ ∈=
≤∑
∑=
δδ
δ
δπ δ
 (3.1) 
 
where   denotes net supply of firm j at x using technology h; hjy )x,p(jπ  is the optimal profit; 
and x has a distribution G(x) satisfying assumptions 2.1, 2.2. By definition, this profit is equal 
to the sum of the value of net supplies at the different locations: . Hence, 
the firm can in principle buy and sell at every market place 
∑= λ λλ ,hjypj )x,p(π λ , taking charge of the 
transportation costs of outputs to, and of inputs from this market. Clearly, the technology index 
h might also be associated to a particular configuration of marketplaces at which the producer 
trades. For notational convenience we do not in the sequel refer explicitly to the marketplace.  
Every producer chooses one technology, represented by a transformation function 
. The transformation function may have a positive value at  , so as to reflect that 
setup costs must be incurred before any production can take place, but we also assume that it is 
feasible to close down the factory, i.e. that there is a technology h for which the transformation 
function is non-positive at  . In Example 1, the associated transformation function can 
be defined as:  
)(H hj ⋅ 0y hj =
0y h
j
=
 
  and .  )x,y(fy)x,y,y(H 1 j2
1
j1
1
j2
1
j1
1
j −−= 0)x,y,y(H 2 j22j12j =
 
We note that model (3.1) has discrete decision variables. This reflects an indivisibility and 
hence a non-convexity in production. Alternatively, this indivisibility can be expressed in the 
space of products but on nonconvex and, in general, disconnected sets, as follows: 
 
 ,         Y . }0),(|{)( ≤∈= xyHRyxY hjnhj )()( xYx hjhj ∪=
 
Hence, model (3.1) can also be written as the maximization of the profit function py on the 
generally nonconvex and possibly disconnected set  Y  but we  maintain a representation 
with discrete choice because this permits to eliminate the discontinuity at aggregate level in a 
constructive way. 
)(xj
 
 
Assumption 3.1.(Transformation) Every firm x with technology j has transformation functions 
, and every such function satisfies the following properties: (i)  ,: RXRH nhj →× )x,y(H hjhj
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it is continuous and strictly quasiconvex in  measurable in ,h
j
y x ; (ii) for each j it has 
possibility of inaction  for some h ; (iii) 0) ≤x,0(H hj
)(2 XL∈)(}0),(:{sup xxyHy hjhjhjhjyhj ≤≤ γ all j,h. ◊ 
)x(hjγ
)x,p(max)x,p( hjhj ππ =
H|py{max)x,p( hj
h
jy
h
j h
j
=π
,(),(),(|( == ′ xpxpxpxG jhjhj πππ
}0)x,y( hj ≤
0)} =
,hj
,
)x( 1
h
j
( ph j
h
jπ
 
Measurability in (i) is a far weaker requirement than continuity and permits to accommodate 
abrupt changes in technological conditions over the space over characteristics. Condition (iii) 
generates a scalar , which is the upper bound on feasible output. Now we can re-define 
the profit functions in the following way: 
 
  (3.2) 
for 
 . (3.3) 
 
We remark that if we replace the technology constraint  by the full set 
production constraints and balances, it becomes possible to calculate the price  at 
location x, as a shadow price to the program. The following assumption is the key step to 
ensure that the aggregate net supply is G-a.s. a continuously differentiable function.  
0)xy(H hj ≤
)x(phj
 
Assumption 3.2.(Regularity) For any positive p and fixed h≠h′: 
 . ◊ 
 
For a two-dimensional vector x, this assumption means that the boundaries between  regions 
choosing different technologies are lines of zero surface. This illustrates how the optimization 
model can be used to generate a zoning map , defined so as to 
maximize , the value of land.  Clearly, it is possible to impose legal restrictions on 
this zoning, expressed as the index set , say, to keep land under natural vegetation. The model 
to be presented can be used to analyze both the direct effect of such restrictions, and the indirect 
effect via the adjustment of prices. 
),(maxarg) xpx h=
)x,p(hjπ
 Assumption 3.2 is satisfied if for all pairs h , the difference between the profit 
functions are nonstationary with respect to one characteristic, say, x
'h,
1  whenever h and are 
both maximal in (3.3) (see Lemma 1). It is mild since it only requires that two competing best 
technologies should not lead to profits that coincide within any sub-region, while the 
underlying best supplies do not. The requirement can be considered constructive as it can 
always be enforced by including in the transformation function of Assumption 3.1, an 
additional perturbation that differentiates between h and . For this, we can define a  
nonnegative perturbation function  that is measurable and nonstationary in  and 
enters as: . 
'h
1
'hε x
0)x),x(y(H 1
h
j
h
j
h
j ≤− ε
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Proposition 1 establishes continuous differentiability of the aggregate profit function, 
and hence single-valuedness and continuity of aggregate net supply.  
 
Proposition 1 (Aggregate net supply): Let the distribution of characteristics and the 
transformation function satisfy assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1, 3.2. Then, the aggregate profit ∫= X jj )x(dG )x,p()p( πΠ , where , of firms in group j is 
continuously differentiable, convex, nonnegative and homogeneous of degree one in p and the 
aggregate net supply mapping Y
),(max),( xpxp hjhj ππ =
p/)p()
j
p(
j
∂∂= Π  is continuous and homogeneous of 
degree zero in p; Y , where  solve 
problem (3.1). 
∫= Xj )p( ∑h hj (δ hj )x(dG)x,p(y)x,p ),(),,( xpyxp hjhjδ
 
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. 
(1) The profit function   is continuously differentiable and convex in p. This follows 
from the Maximum Theorem (see for instance, Varian, 1992) and  assumption 3.1(i)); 
)x,p(h
j
π
)x
h
j
π,(),( pypxp
h
j
h
j =∂∂π , where  is a solution of  (3.3), that is measurable due to 
assumption 3.1(i). Function   is measurable in 
),( xpyhj
)x,p( x  as the optimal value of the 
optimization problem whose feasible is set measurable in x  (assumption 3.1(i), see Castaing 
and Valadier(1977)). 
(2) The profit  of  firms in group j is, almost everywhere w.r.t. )x,p(max)x,p( h
jhj
ππ =
G(x), continuously differentiable, and convex in p, it is nonnegative and homogeneous of 
degree one; by assumption 3.1(i) and 3.2, the function is continuously differentiable in p 
almost everywhere in x; convexity in p follows from (1); homogeneity follows from the 
definition of problem (3.1); non-negativity from the possibility of inaction  3.1(ii); the 
“almost everywhere” property follows from the regularity assumption (see lemmas 1-3). By 
the rule of subdifferentiation of maximum function (see for instance, Rockafellar, 1973):   
 
)}x,p(maxargh|p)x,p({co)x,p( hjh
h
jj πππ ∈∂∂=∂  
                  , )x,p(maxargh|)x,p(y{co hjh
h
j π∈=
 
where   denotes the convex hull. Since all  are measurable, }{⋅co )x,p(h
j
π ),( xpjπ  inherits 
this property, and multifunction ),( xpjπ∂  is also measurable (see Castaing and 
Valadier(1977)). 
(3) By assumption 3.1(iii), profit function ),( xpjπ   and  subdifferential )x,p(jπ∂  are 
bounded by integrable functions, so ∫= )x(dG )x,p(p(j ) jX πΠ  is well defined and by 
Lemma 4  ∫ ∈=∫ ∂=∂ X hjhhjjXj )x(dG)}x,p(maxargh|)x,p(y{co)x(dG )x,p()p( ππΠ . 
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The subdifferential )x,p(jπ∂  is G -a.s. single valued, hence subdifferential  is 
single valued and continuous, and thus 
)p(jΠ∂
)p(
j
Π  is a convex, continuously differentiable 
function. Choose a measurable function )x,p(maxarg hjh π)x,p( ∈h  and define  
   all h ,        Y .  ≠== ),x,p(hh,0 ),x,p(hh,1)x,p(hjδ ∫ ∑= X h hjhjj )x(dG)x,p(y)x,p()p( δ
Remark that since , it follows 
that , and because of single valuedness of 
∑ ∈∈h hjhhjhjhj )}x,p(maxargh|)x,p(y{co)x,p(y)x,p( πδ
)p( )p(j)p(Y jj Π∂⊆ Π∂ , we finally obtain 
p)p(j ∂∂= Π)p()p j∂= Π(Y j . ฀ 
 
4. Consumer behavior 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the representation of consumers by means of a continuum 
offers two major advantages. It allows to include detailed empirical distributions of consumer 
characteristics, as obtained through geo-referenced household surveys and censuses, and it 
permits to deal with discrete choices, which seems important since consumers in general buy 
goods in discrete quantities, such as one car, two pairs of shoes, and they face discrete personal 
choices as to which town, province or country they want to live in, the job they will apply to, 
and so on.   
 To describe consumer behavior, we distinguish r consumer groups, indexed i, 
coinciding with one of the discrete characteristics, say, mxi =  of the households in the survey. 
To represent discrete choices, we introduce the option for the consumer to migrate to 
alternative destinations, indexed s, each with a specific utility function and income. The 
destination might be a physical location, a specific career or a lifestyle. Migration might be 
highly temporary and only reflect a shopping visit to the city, or permanent. Like for producers, 
we assume that all consumer purchases take place at the marketplace and that transportation 
appear as a separate commodity demand.  
 
Assumption 4.1 (Endowments): Each consumer x of group i owns fixed endowments 
 after choosing destination s, such that (i) ; (ii) and ns
i
R)x(e ∈
(dG)x(e
)()( 2 XLxe
s
i ∈ )x(e)x(e 1s1 ≥
0)xX 1∫ > ; (iii) for every x there exists a destination s(x) such that , 
with at least one strict inequality.◊ 0)x(e )x(si ≥
 
Note that this specification can also be used to describe purchases of indivisible commodities 
and that setup costs of migration could be treated in this way.  
 
Assumption 4.2 (Utility): Each consumer x of group i has, for every s, a utility function 
 such that it is (i)  Borel in (c,x), for some ,RXR:u nsi →× )()( 2 XLxsi ∈c  
)X
)x,
()),(( 1Lxxcu
s
i
s
i ∈
nRc ++∈
c(u s
i
∂
,  (ii) continuously differentiable with respect to consumption vector 
 G-a.s. in x, (iii) strictly concave  in  G-a.s. in x; (iv) ; and (v) G-
a.s. in x,   for  
nRc ++∈ 0)x,0(u si =
0c/
k
≥∂ )(xc sic ≤  with at least one strict inequality and 
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0c/)x,c(u k
s
i <∂∂  whenever )(xc sikk >c ; (vi)  for i ,1=  )c(u~)x,c( isi =u  is  increasing in c 
with +∞→∂∂ k1 c)c(u  for 0ck ↓ ; (vii) for  i = 1, ( )∫ ∑+≥ X sk,is )x(dG)x(e
x,c(
i max)x(γk,1c  . ◊ 
)X(L2∈)x(c si
)x(si ∑ ∫ =i X ij 1dG(x) )x(θ
p(r s
i
)x(
= sisi (pe)x,p(r
)(),( 1 XLxpi ∈
∑+ j ij (θ
,p(i( ) x,p(t)x,p(r isis + ∑i ∫X i )x(dG)x,p(t
               
pc               
to  subject       
max)x,p(u
s
s
s
s
c
*
i s
∑ =
∑
= ≥
κ
κ )r s
is
s
}1,0{
∑
∑∈
κ
 
The Borel measurability requirement in (i) is weaker than a continuity requirement in  
We do not impose continuity with respect to x, in order to maintain all flexibility with respect 
to possibly abrupt changes in consumer properties in the space of characteristics. 
).
 
Condition (v) defines an individual satiation level  . Utility is non-satiated as 
long as all consumption falls below this level, but it is non-increasing in any commodity for 
which consumption exceeds it. This guarantees boundedness (even out of equilibrium) and 
hence integrability of the demand by any member in state s. Assumption (vi) expresses that 
there is one (possibly very small) consumer group whose utility function is increasing 
everywhere but does not vary with either the state s or the location x. The requirement on the 
derivative guarantees positive consumption of all commodities. Condition (vii) indicates that 
for this consumer group the satiation level is so high that it exceeds maximal potential supply 
(see also assumption 3.1(iii)). The integrability of its demand is not an issue because all 
members are identical.  Imposing these relatively tight requirements on group 1 enables us to 
maintain weak assumptions for all other groups. 
 Consumer x of group i owns endowments and receives a fixed share e )x(ijθ  of 
the profits of firms in group j; hence the identity  must hold. Thus, 
consumer income consists before transfers of the value of commodity endowments 
 plus profits: 
)x,
pe s
i
 
  . (4.1) j )p()x)x Π
 
Assumption 4.3 (transfers): Each consumer x of group i receives transfers t , such 
that (i) t ; (ii) t  is continuous and homogeneous of degree one in p (iii) 
R)x,p(i ∈
)x
)max  is positive for all p; and (iv) = 0 .◊ 
 
Now the model of consumer x in group i reads: 
 
,1          
x,p(t)x,p(          
          
)x,c(u         
i
s
s
ss
i
s
,0 s
+≤
κκ
 (4.2) 
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for given .Observe that in view of the satiation assumption 4.2(v), program (4.2) has a 
bounded solution even for 
)x,p(ti
0pk = , that determines an optimal destination  as well 
as a (nonnegative) optimal consumption 
)x,p(s
i
∗κ≤∗ )x,p(sic )x(c si , that is defined as that the solution 
of (4.2) under the additional restriction: .1s =κ  Because of strict concavity of utility, 
 is single valued  and continuous for all )x,p(c s
i
∗ 0p ≥ . 
 As in the case of producer problem we can reformulate the consumer problem (4.2) in 
terms of  continuous variables only, but with, in general, piecewise continuous utility functions 
and non-convex consumption sets, by defining consumption sets 
 
 ,     , )}x,p(t)x,p(rpc|Rc{)x,p(C
i
s
i
ns
i
+≤∈= + ),(),( xpCxpC sisi ∪=
 
 as well as  the index sets , and the piecewise continuous utility 
functions  
),(|{),,( xpCcsxpcS sii ∈=
 
 . )x,c(umax)x,p,c(U s
i)x,p,c(Ssi
i
∈=
 
Now problem (4.2) is equivalent to the maximization of  U  over .  ),,( xpci ),( xpCc i∈
 Next, we reformulate problem (4.2) in a more convenient form. For given destination s, 
consumption can  be determined from: 
 
  (4.3) 
 . x)(p,tx)(p,rpc                      
to ject       sub          
 )x,c(umaxx)(p,u 
i
s
i
s
i
s
i
s
i0c
s
i s
i
+≤
= ≥∗
 
Note that by nonsatiation assumption (4.2.v), for 1s ≠ , utility and consumption will at all non-
negative prices, be bounded for every s and all x. and for satiation level c  high enough, the 
budget constraint will hold with equality. Now the functions u  can also be determined as  )x,p(*
i
 
 , (4.4) )x,p(umax)x,p(u)x,p(u s*
is
s*
i
*
i
i ==
 
while ,  for )x,p(c)x,p(c i
s
i
s*
i
= 1)x,p(s*i =κ iss = and ,  for 
. As for production, the maximization can be used to generate a zoning map  
describing the assignments for every location x. Likewise, it is possible to impose restrictions 
 on land use, and to analyze their direct effect as well as their price induced effect. The 
following assumption, similar to (3.2), ensures that the aggregate consumption is G-a.s. a 
continuously differentiable function.  
0)x,p(c s*
i
= 0)x,p(s*i =κ
p(siss ≠
)x(S
)x,
 
Assumption 4.4 (Regularity) For 1s ≠ , ,ts ≠ and any positive p:  
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(i) G   .0)}x,p(u)x,p(u)x,p(u|x( *
i
t
i
s
i
=== ∗∗
 
Like for assumption (3.2) on profits, this assumption is satisfied if for all pairs that correspond 
to maximal utility, the difference between both value functions is nonstationary with respect to 
. The property is easily constructed via a perturbation function  that is measurable 
and nonstationary in  and enters utility as: . 
1x )x( 1
s
iε
x() 1
s
iε+1x )x,c(u~)x,c(u sisisisi =
 
Proposition 2 (Aggregate consumption): Let the distribution of characteristics and the utility, 
endowment and transfer functions satisfy assumptions 2.1, 2.2.  Then, the aggregate consumer 
demand and the aggregate endowment supply  are continuous and homogeneous of degree zero 
in p. 
 
Proof. Define  and )}x,p(u)x,p(u:s{)x,p(S *i
s*
ii ==
        , . )}x,p(Ss|)x,p(c{)x,p(C i
s*
i
*
i ∈= )}x,p(Ss|)x(e{)x,p(E isi*i ∈=
Multivalued mappings  , C , are: ),( xpSi )x,p(
*
i
)x,p(E*
i
(i) measurable in x  for all 0p ≥ ; 
(ii) closed valued and even single valued for almost all x ; 
(iii) homogenous of degree zero in p for almost all x ; 
(iv) upper semicontinuous in 0p ≥ for almost all x ; 
(v) bounded by a function that is integrable in x. 
In conditions (i), (iv), (v) upper semicontinuity is preserved after integration over x . Hence, 
mappings  )x(dG)x,p(C)p(C X
*
i
*
i ∫=  ,           ∫= X *i*i )x(dG)x,p(E)p(E  
are upper semicontinuous in ,  single-valued by (ii) and thus continuous. Since  0≥p
)x,p(S)x,p(S ii λ=   for any 0>λ , C ,  )x,p(C)x,p( *i*i λ= )x,p(E)x,p(E *i*i λ=
hence , ,  mappings C ,  are homogenuous 
in 
)p(C)p(C *i
*
i λ=
0
)p(E)p(E *i
*
i λ= )(* pi )p(E*i
p ≥  of degree zero.฀ 
 
5. Existence of  a competitive Equilibrium 
 
The aggregate net supply and demand of consumers and producers in the general equilibrium 
model (3.1), (4.1) and (4.2) with given transfers are obtained as integral values: 
 
 ( )∫ ∑= ∗∗∗ X s sisii )x(dG   )x,p(c )x,p()p(C κ  (5.1) 
 ( )∫ ∑= ∗X s sisi*i dG(x). )x(e)x,p()p(E κ  (5.2) 
 ( ) dG(x)  )x,p(y)x,p()p(Y X h h*jh*j*j ∫ ∑= δ  (5.3) 
 
where  solve consumer problem (4.2) and  solve 
producer problem (3.1). A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a price vector such that 
)x,p(c ,)x,p( s
i
s
i
∗∗κ )x,p(y),x,p( h*
j
h*
j
δ
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 , (5.4) 0)p(Z =∗
for 
 ∑∑ −∑ −= ∗∗∗ j *ji ii i ),p(Y)p(E)p(C)p(Z  
and 
 , Pp∈
 
where P  denotes the price simplex }1p,0p{P k k∑ =≥= .  
 
Proposition 3 (Competitive equilibrium): Let the distribution of characteristics and the utility, 
endowment and transfer functions satisfy assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 4.1-4.4, and the 
transformation functions satisfy assumptions 3.1, 3.2, then model (5.1)-(5.4) has an 
equilibrium, with positive prices.  
 
Proof. By propositions 1 and 2 for all Pp∈ , excess demand  is continuous and 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices. And by assumption 4.3, equation (4.1) and 
nonnegativity of profit in proposition 1, it satisfies Walras Law (  for all 
)p(*Z
)p(*pZ 0= Pp∈ ). 
Furthermore, by assumptions 4.1(ii) and 4.2(v), consumers 1i =  have positive income at all 
prices and demand more than can be supplied if any price drops to zero. Then, by standard 
arguments (see, e.g. Arrow and Hahn, 1971, chapter 1) there exists an equilibrium, and price 
must be positive since, by assumption 4.2 (vii) excess demand could not be nonnegative 
otherwise.฀ 
 
6. Spatial welfare optimum: a dual approach 
 
While the spatial competitive equilibrium determines prices for a specified transfer function, 
through the spatial welfare optimum to be considered in this section the transfers are 
determined on the basis of a welfare program with given positive weights )x(
i
α  on the 
various consumers. This welfare program maximizes the weighted sum over groups i of the 
integral over x of individual utilities multiplied by the destination factor  and summed 
over s. The resulting welfare program is hard to handle numerically in a straightforward 
manner, because it is defined in a functional space. Therefore, we propose to formulate the 
equivalent dual welfare program, that essentially replaces the budget constraint from the 
model of the previous section by a fixed welfare weight, from which the transfers and the 
solution of the original program follow.  
s
iκ
 Thus, for given positive marginal utility of expenditure )x(/1)x(
ii
αµ = , i.e. equal to  
the inverse welfare weight we can maximize the surplus of consumer : ),( xi
   (6.1) 
,1                   
        to  subject             
                   
   ))]x,p(r pc( )x()x,c(u[max   )x,p(w
s
s
}1,0{,0c
s
i
s
is
ss
i
s
i
ss
∑ =
−−∑=
∈≥
κ
µκκο
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with optimal surplus , consumption )x,p(w
i
ο )x,p(c s
i
ο  and switches  By 
construction,  for all 
).x,p(s
i
οκ
0=)x,p(siοκ s  except some , is (isi 1)x,p =οκ . By assumptions (4.1)-
(4.3), this problem has a bounded solution. Program (6.1) defines the ( -specific 
subproblem: 
), xi
 
 ))}x,p(r pc)(x()x,c(u{maxx)(p, w s
ii
s
i0c
s
i
−−= ≥ µο . (6.2) 
 
By assumptions 4.2(v),(vi),  , are well defined for all x)(p,w si
ο 0p ≥ , since satiation ensures 
that consumption will not exceed )x(c si , this program attains its optimum. The same applies 
to function  
 
 , )x,p(w)x,p(wmax)x,p(w i
s
i
s
isi
οοο ==
 
that, by (6.2), is equal to the sum of the consumer surplus 
 and the producer surplus , multiplied by ))x,p(pc)x()x),x,p(c(u( iii
s
ii
s
i
s
i
οο µ−
)(xi
)x,p(r i
s
iµ , where  is the optimal state for member x of group i and  
denotes the optimal consumption in this state. This value can be interpreted as the “self-
earned” utility since for 
),( xpss ii =
)(xi
)x,p(c i
s
i
ο
µ  such that the revenue balance with expenditure, it coincides 
with individual utility.  The associated regularity assumption is: 
 
Assumption 6.1 (Regularity): For i 1≠  and any positive p:  
 0}ts);x,p(w)x,p(w)x,p(w|x{G
i
t
i
s
i
=≠== οοο .  
 
The assumption on consumer surplus can be enforced constructively in the same way as for 
assumption 4.4 for utility itself. For every i, we can now define associated income transfers: 
 
 ∑ −= s sisisii ))x,p(r)x,p(pc)(x,p()x,p(t οοο κ . (6.3) 
 
The following proposition establishes that the Second Theorem of welfare economics also 
applies in our case. For )x(/1)x( ii αµ = , the dual social welfare function can be defined as 
 
 ∫=
X
)x(dG)x,p(W)p(W ο  (6.4) 
for 
 , (6.5) ∑= i ii )x,p(w)x()x,p(W οο α
 
where )x(iα  satisfies: 
 
Assumption 6.2 (Welfare weight normalization and nonnegligibility of consumer 1)  
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(i) )x(
i
α  are nonnegative integrable functions and 1)x(dG)x(X i i =∫ ∑ α ; 
(ii) 0)x(
11
>≡αα .◊ 
 
By assumptions 4.1(i), 4.2(v),(vi), and 6.2, functions )x,p(w)x( ii
οα  are integrable and hence 
function W  is well defined for )p( 0p ≥ . 
 
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with transfers): Let the distribution of characteristics and the 
utility, endowment and transfer functions satisfy assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 4.1-4.4, 6.1,  and the 
transformation functions satisfy assumptions 3.1, 3.2, while welfare weights satisfy assumption 
6.2, then the solution of 
 
  (6.6) )p(Wmin
0p≥
 
defined as in  (6.4)-(6.5) supports a competitive equilibrium (5.4) with transfers (6.3), with 
unique and positive optimal prices.  
 
Proof. Function W  is convex because )p( )x,p(w si
ο  is convex in p (see e.g. Avriel, 1976, 
Theorem 5.1). Since by assumption 4.2(iv), we have u , it follows that 
 and 
0)x,0(s1 =
)x)x(pe)x,p(w s1
s
1 ≥ο (e)xp)x,p(w s111 ≥ ,p(s s11∑ οο αα κ . By assumption 4.1(ii)  
 ∫ +∞→∫ ≥ X 1X 111 )x(dG)x(ep)x(dG)x,p(w αα ο     if +∞→p . (a) 
 
By assumptions 3.1(ii), 4.2(iv)  all 0)x,p(wi ≥ο , hence since by assumption 6.6 consumer 1 
is nonnegligible, it follows from (6.4) and (a) that the convex function satisfies W  
and 
0)p( ≥
 
   if  +∞→)p(W ∞→p . 
 
Hence, W  achieves its minimum. Thus, we have the following representation: )p(
 
 ∑ ∫ −−= i X sisisisiis )x(dG))]x,p(r)x,p(pc()x),x,p(c(u)x([max)p(W οοοα  
 ∑ ∫ ∑−−−= i X j jijsisisisiis )x(dG])p()x()x(pe)x,p(pc()x),x,p(c(u)x([max Πθα οο∑ ∫ ∑+−−i X j jsisisisiis )p()x(dG))]x(e)x,p(c(p)x),x,p(c(u)x([max Πα = οο  
 . ∑ ∫ ∑+−−= ≥i X j jsisii0cs )p()x(dG))]x(ec(p)x,c(u)x(([maxmax Πα
 
Now by regularity assumption 6.1, function W is differentiable for )( p 0p ≥ , and by Lemma 
4 and Proposition 1: 
 
 ∑−∑−∑−=−=∂∂ j ji ii i ))p(Y)p(E)p(C( )p(ZpW οοο  . 
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A stationary point p* of the convex function W , clears the market, i.e. corresponds to 
nonnegative excess demand:  
)p(
 
 0*)p(ZpW ≥−=∂∂ ο  ,        0*)p(Z*p =ο . (b) 
 
Now, by assumption 4.2(vii), consumer 1i =  has demand strictly below satiation level and 
by 4.2(vi), positive consumption. By (6.2) *pc/u 111 µ=∂∂ , and hence  and 
. Moreover, because of strict concavity of utility, differentiability and the 
boundary property 4.2(vi) of the derivative, 
0* >p
0*)( =pZ ο
)x,p(s1w
ο  is strictly convex (it is a Legendre 
transformation, see Avriel, 1976, p. 109), and since by assumption 6.6 consumer  has 
positive measure, and  is convex  for i
1i =
)x,p(w si
ο 1≠ , this property carries over to W(p). 
Hence, p* is unique. 
 
Part 2. Equilibrium with transfers. We show that for 0)x(
i
>µ  a stationary point of W  
is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium (4.2) with transfers (6.3) , where 
)p(
)x(
i
µ  is the 
value of the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint of the individual 
consumer problem. Let { )}x,p(c),x,p( si
s
i
οοκ  be a solution of  (6.1), i.e. for all c , 
, , we have 
0s ≥
}1,0{s ∈κ ∑ =s s 1κ
 
   ≤∑ −−s sisissis ))x,p(r pc)(x()x,c(u( µκ
 ∑ −−≤ s sisiisisisi ))x,p(r )x,p(pc)(x()x),x,p(c(u)(x,p( οοο µκ , (c) 
Then,  
 ∑≤∑ s sisisis ssis )x),x,p(c(u)x,p()x,c(u οοκκ  
 
for all , , , and such that 0cs ≥ }1,0{s ∈κ ∑ =s s 1κ
 
 , (d) )x,p(t)x,p(rpc is
s
i
s
s
ss +∑≤∑ κκ
 
where  are defined by (6.3). Since {)x,p(ti )}x,p(c),x,p(
s
i
s
i
οοκ  satisfies (d). Hence, it also 
provides a solution to (4.2) with transfers (6.3) (implicitly dependent on )x(iµ ). Conversely, 
for given  )x(iµ , solution )}x,p(sc),x,p({ isi οοκ  and transfers (6.3) inequality (c) can be 
rewritten in the form   
 ∑≤∑ ∑ −−− s sisisis s isississis )x),x,p(c(u)x,p())x,p(t)x,p(r pc()x()x,c(u( οοκκµκ , 
 
i.e. )x(iµ  is a Lagrange multiplier for a budget constraint in (4.2). The same applies to 
producer decisions. Obviously, transfers sum to zero. ฀ 
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This proposition shows that the minimum of W(p) uniquely defines a competitive equilibrium 
with transfers. Such a competitive equilibrium is known to be Pareto efficient in terms of the 
aggregate utility of every group i, and more generally of any group of consumers with positive 
measure: no group could achieve higher utility without any group being worse off. Yet, Pareto 
efficiency cannot be established, and in fact becomes a meaningless concept for the atomless 
consumer, since it always is possible to improve utility for any group that has zero measure.  
 We observe that in conditions of proposition 4, since commodity balances hold and 
solutions of (6.1) are specialized in the optimum, despite of nonconvexities, (6.2)-(6.5) imply 
that dual welfare is equal to primal (social) welfare: 
 
   =∑ ∫= i X )x(si)x(sii )x(dG)x*,p(c(u)x(*)p( iiαW  
   ,  (6.7) ∑ ∫= ⋅⋅⋅⋅ s,i X sisisii)(),(y),(k),(c )x(dG)x),x(c(u)x(k)x(max hjhjsisi αδ
where the maximum is taken over measurable functions c , all i  
and , all , subject to constraints 
}1,0{)(,0)( ∈≥ xkx sisi s, ,
}1,0{)(),( ∈xxy hjhj δ hj,
   ;  ∑ ∑+∑ ≤ s,i s,i hjhjsisis,i sisi )x(y)x()x(e)x(k)x(c)x(k δ
   ,  all ∑ ≤h hjhjhj 0)x),x(y(H)x(δ j ; 
   ,  all ;      ,  all ∑ =s si 1)x(k i ∑ =h hj 1)x(δ j . 
 
We also note that in this model the welfare weights define price normalization, so that there 
is no scope for further normalization on the simplex, and )p(Z ο  is not homogeneous of 
degree zero in prices, unlike . )p(Z*
 Clearly, use of the welfare program obviously has the disadvantage that it does not 
impose restrictions on transfers. Yet, we note that trade balances at fixed prices can be 
incorporated within the technology set, as a technique to transform imports into exports. 
 Finally, the minimization of W  as it is seen from (6.4), (6.5) belongs to the class of 
so-called stochastic minimax problems (see Ermoliev, 1988). In the following section we shall 
use this fact to develop a stochastic tâtonnement procedure for searching equilibrium. 
)p(
 
7. Deterministic versus stochastic welfare tatonnement 
 
If it was easy to evaluate excess demand, a deterministic price adjustment procedure could be 
used to compute equilibrium prices. Specifically, Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) have proved that 
if the excess demand satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)  )p(Z
 
  for all and 0)p(Z*p > P*p ∈ Pp∈  such that  0*)p(Z = , ,  (7.1) 0)p(Z ≠
 
then Walrasian tatonnement can be used. For excess demand as defined by the general 
equilibrium model of proposition 3, and prices on the simplex }1p|0p{P k k =∑≥= , the 
property can only be proved to hold in very special cases. But any excess demand   in 
(6.7) associated to a welfare optimum satisfies this condition, with price on a compact set 
)p(Z ο
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}pp0{P ≤≤=
)1t(p
. There is in this case no scope for normalization on the simplex, since price 
normalization already follows from the welfare weights. Starting from given , one 
could specify the algorithm: 
1
p)1(p =
=+
P
ojPr
(p(Z ο
Pp)1(p
1
∈=
)1t(p =+
x),t(p(z hj p(y)x,p(
ο
∑≥ tt ,0ρ
                                                          
 
 ))],t(p(Z)t(p[ojPr
tP
ορ+  t = 1,2,… (7.2) 
 
where  is the projection operator on P and step-size multipliers 
t
ρ  are sufficiently 
small.1 Yet the difficulty in applying this tâtonnement rule to our model is that, due to the 
integrals, computation of excess demand becomes very hard and necessarily inaccurate. In fact, 
the procedure presupposes that there is a central planner who is able to compute aggregate 
excess demand without error, and hence has to possess all information about all points x. 
Suppose on the contrary that we possess at every iteration t, a statistical estimate of  
then one might expect that, if this estimate is asymptotically unbiased, the iteration process will 
eventually converge to an equilibrium. The proposed stochastic Walrasian tâtonnement process 
builds on this idea. The key observation is that in (6.1) aggregate excess demand is the 
expected value of the total net demand 
)),t
)x,p(zο  of all consumers with characteristic x, if we 
treat G(x) as distribution of random events. The stochastic tâtonnement process uses a sequence 
of independent random drawings x(t) from the distribution G(x),2 and starting from a given 
 adjusts p(t) according to: 
 
 ))]t(x),t(p(z)t(p[ojPr tP
ορ+ ,  t =1,2, … (7.3) 
for 
 ∑∑ −∑ −= h,j hjs,i sisis,i sisi ).x, )x(e )x,p()x,p(c )x,p() δκκ οοο    
 
We remark that the evaluation of excess demand and the associated price adjustment are only 
required for commodities and marketplaces where the agents located at x are active. Indeed, 
this process converges. 
 
Proposition 5. (Convergence of stochastic tâtonnement to a welfare equilibrium): Let the 
assumptions of proposition 3 hold. Then for  step-sizes 
t
ρ such that: 
  (7.4) ∑ ∞<∞= t 2tt , , ρρ
process (6.3) converges, with probability 1, to an  equilibrium price. 
 
Proof. see Ermoliev et al. (2000), taking into account that )p(Z ο  satisfies WARP as a 
subgradient of the convex function W .฀ )p(
 
1 Recently, Brown and Shannon (2000) have formulated sufficient conditions for deterministic tatonnement 
to converge locally. 
        2
 See Rubinstein (1981) and Kalos and Whitlock (1986) for random sampling from the given  distribution G(x).  
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In fact, the rule t/.constt =ρ satisfies requirement (7.4). As argued in Ermoliev et al. (2000), 
in case WARP does not hold, process (7.4) requires additional shocks for convergence. The 
stochastic Walrasian tâtonnement process adds to the intuitive appeal of the classical 
tâtonnement the property of full decentralization. In the classical process (7.2) there is an 
auctioneer who adjusts prices in proportion to the prevailing excess demand whose calculation 
requires all agents to communicate their net trades. In the stochastic version, at any given point 
during the iteration process, only a random collection of  consumers have to communicate their 
intentions.  
 However, this “purely” dual approach has the limitation that, to avoid solving 
problems (6.7) in functional space, it requires explicit demand )x,p(c s
i
ο  and net supply 
. In practice only the primal functions will be available for calculations. In other 
words, ,  are solutions of internal problems that require internal iterations 
and cannot be obtained without errors. Hence,  in (7.3) the estimates of the gradient of W  
in (6.6) are subject to errors, say, error 
)x,p(y hj
c
i
ο )x,p(s )x,p(y hj
)p(
)t(ε  at iteration . Consequently, at every iteration 
the Weak Axiom only holds up to a certain accuracy. Fortunately, convergence of (7.3) is 
ensured, nonetheless, provided 
t
0)t( →ε , which is a relatively mild requirement, since the 
change in p tends to zero by construction, making it easier to achieve accuracy. This 
convergence property is based on the fact that the approximation of ))t(p(Z ο  calculated in 
this case is the so-called )t(ε -subgradient of W . )p(
 Furthermore, we note that the strict quasiconvexity requirement of assumption 3.1(i) 
on the transformation function and the strict concavity requirement of assumption 4.2(iii) on 
utility could be relaxed into continuous and quasiconvex, and quasiconcave, respectively. 
This would result in set-valued (uppersemicontinuous, convex valued) correspondences for 
excess demand, and non-differentiability of the welfare function W . Yet, for the welfare 
programs and the bargaining procedure, the SQG-procedure applies as before as gradients are 
to be replaced by subdifferentials, from which the procedure can estimate an element. For the 
competitive equilibrium the same principles apply but the derivation of the excess demand 
correspondence is more involved. 
)p(
 Finally, we mention some properties of the rate of convergence. The asymptotic rate 
of convergence of the sequence {  is usually of order 1 , )}t(p βt/ 10 ≤< β  (see, e.g. Polyak 
(1983)). There is also the following interesting non-asymptotic result by Nemirovski and 
Yudin (1978), that  illustrates the importance of introducing additional averaging to speed up 
convergence.  
 
Proposition 6. (rate of convergence). Construct an averaged (Cesàro) sequence of 
approximations :))1()1( Ppp ∈=(  
 
1,2,...t    ),1t(p)t(p)1()1t(p
1t1t
=++−=+ ++ σσ   (7.5) 
with , then for any optimal ∑= =t 1tt / τ τρρσ P*p ∈  and for any sequence of steps 0t ≥ρ , 
the following estimate holds true: 
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[ ]  ∑ ∑+−≤− == t 1t 1 22 2C*p)1(pE*)p(W))t(p(WE τ ττ τ ρρ  
where expectation E is taken over all sequences {p(t)}, generated by (7.5), and ∫≥ ∈ X 2Pp )x(dG)x,p(zsupC . 
 
Proof.  See Nemirowski and Yudin (1978).฀ 
 
This proposition shows that the Cesàro sequence )}t(p{  may converge to the equilibrium 
 in the mean (and hence in probability) under weaker assumptions than (7.4) with, for 
example, 
*p
.tconst
t
=ρ   
 
8. Nonrival demand and infrastructure development 
 
Suppose that there is an input, denoted by the vector  that can benefit all producers of firm j 
using technology h, and also a demand  that brings utility to all consumers of group who 
choose destination s. These inputs are used to maintain general facilities like road signs, and 
more generally information networks, for which users do not compete, unlike the rival goods of 
the previous sections, such as cars. Recall that prices as well as demand and supply are 
differentiated by marketplace, and that producers and consumers can choose where they want 
to buy or sell. Hence, it may be of interest to allow for adjustment in the capacity of the 
marketing and transportation infrastructure.  
h
j
q
s
i
d i
 Infrastructure facilities usually have both a rival and a non-rival aspect. Information is 
typically non-rival and a marketplace where it is amply available will tend to be more 
attractive. As non-rivalry does not create any increasing returns, there is no immediate 
agglomeration effect around marketplaces. Rather because of decreasing returns, there will be a 
tendency to spread the non-rival inputs.  Yet, the possibility to save on transportation costs may 
endogenously create a pattern of spatial concentration and agglomeration. In short, various 
patterns may emerge and economies of scope may be present but the present assumptions do 
not produce any specific pattern by necessity.   
 Alternatively, the vector x might refer to uncertain, possibly geo-referenced events, 
with the non-rival demand relating to beginning-of-period investments, before uncertainty is 
revealed, and the discrete decisions are part of the coping mechanism once x is known. As 
clearing prices are independent of x, all uncertainty is realized in the proportions dictated by the 
distribution G(x), and may thus be interpreted as idiosyncratic. Conversely, incorporating 
nonrival demand becomes inescaple whenever we intend to include this type of uncertainty. 
 Finally, there may be additional (separate) variables q  common for all  and 
variables common to all  but we disregard them here. 
ij d, sh,
dq, shij ,,,
 Assume that the nonrival demand enter the utility and endowment functions via 
separate terms, and similarly for production. Utility and endowment functions are then written 
 and , for )x,d,c(u s
i
s
i
s
i
)x,d,c(e s
i
s
i
s
i
1i ≠ , but independent of s and x for , while 1i =
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transformations functions read . The non-rival consumer and input demand  
and  are independent of x. We remark that welfare problem (6.6)  remains unchanged if it is 
modified to hold for given values of non-rival demand (d,q). The main issue is now to avoid 
non-concavity when prices and nonrival demand are determined simultaneously 
)x,q,y(H h
j
h
j
h
j
x)q,d,(p,
s
i
d
h
j
q
w
)x,d,c(u si
s
i
s
i − λ
lim
0↓ δδ
,0) = lim
,0) ≥
D,/C(e i
s
i
s
i
s
i
s
i κκ
 1
),,( ≤−
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xQY
Yp
h
j
h
j
h
j
h
h
jh
         wi
0↓κ
d,c
C(si
( siκ
),qp
,0=
)hj
 
wmaxx)q,d,(p,          sisi
οο =  (8.1) 
and 
))x,q,d,p(r pc)(x(maxx)q,d,(p, si
s
ii0c
s
s
i
−= ≥ο  (8.2) 
 
measures the sum of the consumer and the producer surplus attributable to agent i in position  
s-x. For this, we define the “aggregate” variables  and  and make the 
following limit assumption on the transformation functions, and the utility and endowment 
functions. 
s
i
s
i
s
i
dD κ= h
j
h
j
h
j
qQ δ=
 
Assumption 8.1 (limit property) G-a.s., for all j,h and 
 and  
 concave, and for some s, G-a.s., for all i,s. 
,0)x,/Y(H h
j
h
j
=δ
D,/C(e(
i
s
i
s
i0↓ κκκx,/D,/C(ulim sisisi κκκ
)(es
i
0,0(es
i
))x,0,0(e)x,/ s
i
s −κ
 
Assumption 8.1 ensures that the extended functions  and  
, are jointly concave in  
and , respectively (see Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997), Theorem A.1.5). We can 
now verify that the profit 
)x,/Q,/Y(H hj
h
j
h
j
h
j
h
j
h
j δδδ
,Y,( hj
h
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is continuous, convex in p and concave in q. Consequently, for the consumer the value function 
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is continuous and concave in ( . Furthermore, if  for all j , or  for all i,  
then programs (8.3) and (8.4) will under the regularity assumption G-a.s. yield  and  
equal to either zero or unity (full specialization) and by monotonicity in assumption (4.2) the 
inequality constraint can be taken to hold with equality in both programs. Yet, in the general 
case,  and  can lie inside the unit interval and measure the fraction from j that moves to h 
and from  i that moves to s. Therefore, we can define the welfare function 
)q,d
j
h
j
qq =
i
s
i
dd =
h
j
δ s
i
κ
h
jδ siκ
 
 qTpdpT)x(dG)x,q,d,p(w)x()q,d,p(W
qi d
X
ii∑ −−∫= οα  (8.5) 
 
where T  and T  map d and q to demand vectors of the same dimension as prices p.  
d q
 
Proposition 7 (nonrival demand): The saddlepoint of the minimax problem: 
 
 , (8.6) )q,d,p(Wmaxmin*W
0q,0d0p ≥≥≥=
 
 supports a competitive equilibrium with transfers at unique and positive equilibrium 
prices and unique optimal collective decisions . *p *)q*,d(
 
Proof. Maximum function W ))p(*q),p(*d,p(W)q,d,p(Wmax)p(
0q,0d
== ≥≥  is 
convex, hence  it has subdifferential 
 
(8.7)                                                                                                                    qTdT    
)x(dG]))p(*q,p(Y))x),p(*q),p(*d,p(E)x),p(*q),p(*d,p(C([
)p(W
qd
X h,j
h
js,i
s
i
s
i−−
∫ ∑−∑ −
=∂
οοο
 
which is the aggregated excess demand at given prices p  and social decisions 
. The remainder of the proof is as for proposition 4. ฀ )(* ),(* pqpd
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Computation 
 
This enables us to develop a version of the stochastic tâtonement with sequential adjustment 
of prices and decisions . This is a stochastic version of the Arrow-Hurwicz algorithm 
for finding the saddle point (see Arrow et al. (1958), Goldstein (1972) and Bertsekas (1982)). 
For , 
q,d,p
)q,d(b =
 
 ))]t(x),t(b),t(p(w)t(p[ojPr)1t(p
ptP
ρ−=+ , (8.8) 
 ))t(x),t(b),t(p(w)t(b[ojPr)1t(b btB σ+=+ , 
 
and its Cesàro averaging: 
 ∑∑= == t 1t 1 ))(b),(p())t(b),t(p( τ τττ ττ σρττσρ , (8.9) 
 
where x(t) are independently drawn from the distribution G(x) and  and  ))(),(),(( txtbtpwp
))(),(),(( txtbtpwb  are estimates of the sub-differentials  ),( bp ,  at 
, . The first process is a stochastic version of saddlepoint processes. The 
convergence of Cesàro averaged process was studied by Nemirowski and Yudin (1978) and 
Uryas'ev (1990).  
),( bpWb∂
)t(pp = )t(bb = Wp∂
 
Proposition 8 (convergence): Let nRP ⊂  and  be convex compact sets, W  be 
a function convex in 
mRB ⊂ )b,p(
p and concave in b, and W *)b*,p(W* =  its value at a saddle point. 
Denote by  an 
t
F σ -algebra generated by random variables { . 
Assume that almost surely 
)}(b),t(p),...,1(p t(b),...,1
 
 ,           ))(),((}|)({ tbtpWFtwE ptp ∂∈ ))t(b),t(p(W}F|)t(w{E btb ∂∈ , 
 +∞<≤+ Const)t(wE)t(wE 2
b
2
p
, 
 
random variables 
t
ρ  , 
t
σ  are  -measurable  and a.s.  
t
F
 0,0 tt >> σρ , , +∞<2t2tE σρ
 0lim
tt
1tt
t =− −σρ ρρ , 0tt 1ttt =lim − −σρ σσ , 
 0lim =tt ρ ,   lim 0tt =σ ,  . ∑ +∞=+∞=1t ttσρ
Then, for almost all trajectories { : )}t(b),t(p
 
 0*])),((max[lim =−∈ WbtpWBbt ,        0))]t(b,p(Wmin*W[lim Ppt =− ∈ . 
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Proof. See Uryas'ev (1990). ฀ 
 
This proposition indicates that convergence to an optimum with respect to prices can be 
established with probability one, if we average in parallel over nonrival decisions b for 
convergence of prices, and conversely over prices p for convergence of nonrival decisions. 
 
9. Adjusting welfare weights in a bargaining procedure 
 
In the general equilibrium model with given transfers it possible to distribute income 
according to entitlements. In the welfare maximizing model transfers follow from given 
welfare weights. Yet it is possible to go a step further and endogenize welfare weight so as to 
meet distribution rules and to respect initial claims. In this section, we address this issue 
along the lines of the bargaining literature and construct a model in which a fair distribution 
of expenditures is determined through bargaining, i.e. by sharing the surplus over given 
reservation utilities iu  according to a specified constraint. In fact this constraint appears to be 
the dual representation of an underlying social welfare criterion. Such a problem naturally 
arises in the context of land consolidation when households agree to pool their land resources 
and consolidate the holdings while insisting that the gains from consolidation should be 
shared fairly (see e.g. Keyzer and Ermoliev, 1999). At a higher scale, neighboring districts of 
a country may agree to redesign their boundaries. 
 Since the welfare weight become decision variables, we assume across x constant 
marginal utility of income: .1)x(
ii
αµ =  This means that individuals x in group i have the 
same welfare weight iα , implying that they share a common budget constraint even though 
the income distribution may be uneven within the group. The economic justification for such 
an assumption could be that x refers to uncertain  random events. In this case the budget 
constraint would equalize expected revenue with expected expenditure under perfect 
insurability.   
 We write p,(W )α ,W  instead of W)x,p,(αο )x,p(W),p( ο  in (6.4), (6.5) to reflect 
the dependence on welfare weights, and note that these functions are jointly convex in 
)p,(α , nondecreasing, homogeneous of degree one in the first argument and nonincreasing 
in the second. 
 To endogenize the welfare weights in a bargaining context, there are basically two 
options. The first postulates a social welfare function V  and maximizes social welfare, 
subject to all the utility and technological constraints. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
associated welfare program is hard to handle numerically, because it is defined in functional 
space. Hence, we pursue the alternative option that uses a dual representation in which 
bargaining minimizes the undistributed surplus over the reservation utilities, subject to a 
social constraint that incorporates the specific bargaining concept. For example, under the 
principles of Kalai-Smorodinski (1975) the constraint is linear and the dual program reads: 
)u(
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 (9.1) 
 
where iu  are given values. Differentiating under the integral (see Lemma 4) and applying the 
envelope theorem, while keeping )x(/1)x( ii αµ =  in (6.2), we obtain: 
 
 ∫==∂∂ X iii )x(dG )x,p,(u)p,(u)p,(W αααα οο , (9.2) 
 
which evaluates the utility  of every group i. The first-
order conditions of (9.1) imply, for multiplier 
))x),x,p,(c(u)x,p,(u ii
s
i
s
ii αα οο =
0≥λ : 
 
 ,u)p,(u
iii
λγα ≥−ο with equality whenever iα  is positive, (9.3) 
 
and 
 0)u()p,(W
ii ii
=∑ +− γλαα . (9.4) 
 
This form of Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining corresponds exactly to a social welfare criterion 
without any substitutability across groups, i.e. with )/)uu((min)u( iiiiV γ−= . Clearly, 
several generalizations are possible to accommodate alternative rules for sharing the surplus, 
such as Nash (1950), where )0,uumax()u( iiiV −∏= . The dual formulation can actually 
accommodate any  concave linear homogenous 1)(F ≥α  but it is not possible to include 
(variable) prices in this constraint since this would undermine the market clearing at the 
optimum. 
 
 Stochastic bargaining tatonnement 
 
Alternatively, minimization problem (9.1) can be written as the following stochastic minimax 
problem: 
 
(9.5)                                      },u])x(dG)0 )x,y(H|py(maxmax                
)x(dG))x(pepc)x,c(u(maxmax{[min
i iij X
h
jyh
i X
s
i
s
ii0cs0p,L ∑−∑ ∫ ≤+ ∑ ∫
++−≥≥∈ ααα  
 
where ∑ ≥≥= i iii }0,1|{L αγαα . Based on  (9.5), a straightforward extension of process 
(7.3) with welfare weight adjustment can be formulated: 
 
 )))],t(x),t(p),t((uu()t([ojPr)1t( tL αραα ο−+=+  (9.6) 
 ))],t(x),t(p),t((z)t(p[ojPr)1t(p tP αρ ο+=+  t = 1,2,…. 
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To evaluate  and ))t(x),t(p),t((u αο ))t(x),t(p),t((z αο  in (9.6) one has to solve, for 
current )t(p),t(α  and sampled , consumer problems (6.2) for every , and producer 
problems (3.2), (3.3) for all producers j. Instead, to ease calculations, one could select 
consumers i and producers j randomly, rather than evaluating the net demand of all of them 
(see discussion in Ermoliev et al. (2000)). Convergence conditions for (9.6) are similar to 
those of (7.3). 
)(tx i
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